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SECURITY INFORMATION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

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STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 298

SUBJECT: The Changes in the 1952 Statutes of the CPSU

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1. The new Soviet CP statutes, proposed by N. S. Krushchev at the 19th Party Congress, reveal some significant modifications, omissions and additions when compared with the 1939 statutes. This fourth revision since the foundation of the Soviet Union appears to:

a. Adapt the character and tasks of the Party to the postwar position of the USSR and the international Communist movement;

b. Eliminate, so far as possible, duplication of State and Party machineries, thereby streamlining the government for greater efficiency;

c. Diminish, to the advantage of the State, the influence of the Party upon the administrative and executive branches of the government.

OVERALL IMPRESSIONS

2. In general, the new statutes seem to be based upon the claim that capitalism and landlordism have been ended in the USSR; that there is no longer a need for class struggle; and that socialism has been achieved. Consequently, the tasks of the Party have changed; it is no longer the "vanguard of the revolution" but is slated to become the Soviet State's ideological front and its chief "pedagogical" apparatus. The Party is officially in charge of guiding the way from socialism to Communism, but will probably not be independent in deciding how this transition is to be handled and when it can be pushed to completion.

3. The base of the Party has been broadened, thereby depriving the industrial proletariat of its membership monopoly. The duties of the members have been increased, but instead of being professional revolutionists, they are now predominantly informers and propagandists.

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4. In previous statutes, the Party clearly remained above the State, guiding and leading it; now it does not appear to have such preferred position, and its aims are in many ways identified with those of the State.

5. The new statutes communicate a sense of achievement and stability; they also contain references to Soviet nationalism and show very little revolutionary aggressiveness. It is not impossible that Stalin's speech at the 19th Party Congress, directed to the foreign Communist parties, was designed to supply to non-Soviet Communists what the new CPSU constitution fails to offer: the spirit of world revolution and the assurance that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union will remain the source of world revolutionary strength and inspiration.

**DETAILS OF SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE**

6. In particular, the most significant changes of the new Party statutes are:

a. The Party has been renamed **COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION** instead of "All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)."

b. The Party is no longer the "organized vanguard of the working class" but a "voluntary militant union of Communists holding the same views, formed of the people of the working class, the toiling peasantry, and the toiling intelligentsia."

c. The term "dictatorship of the proletariat" has been replaced with "socialist system" (Art. 28).

d. The sentence in the Preamble of the 1939 statutes: "in its work, the Party will be guided by the theory of Marxism and Leninism," has been eliminated.

e. While the cultivation of a "spirit of internationalism" is still listed among the duties of Party members, members are now also held responsible for the "active defense of the Soviet homeland against aggressive action of enemies." This reference to patriotic nationalism was not in the 1939 statutes.

f. The small Politbureau is replaced by a large Presidium.

g. The Orgbureau is liquidated; organizational work is now presumably the task of the Secretariat.

h. The Central Committee now organizes a new Committee of Party Control to replace the old Control Committee. The delegates of the Committee attached to republics, regions and counties will be inde-

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pendant of local Party interference. Agencies of the State may now report crimes of Party members to the Control Committee and thereby initiate action for the expulsion of Party members.

1. While the Party still carries out political work in the Soviet armed forces, the scope of this work may have been decreased; there are no longer references to "political divisions", "Party commissions", and "Party conferences" in the Army and Navy. (It was reported some time ago that Party officials delegated to political work in the armed forces must now undergo full military training.)

**THE PARTY-STATE RELATIONS IN THE USSR AND OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES**

7. The basic problem in the organization of a revolutionary society is the relationship of the ruling Party to the State. In the USSR, true to Leninist concepts, the CP has controlled the State. Until World War II the highest Party organ, the Politbureau, made the decisions; the Council of People's Commissars, representing the agencies of the State, carried out the Politbureau's orders. Outside the USSR, the Party-State dualism served useful purposes: the diplomatic and economic missions of the State pursued one "official" policy; the Party, working through the Comintern, sought to achieve its revolutionary objectives which were quite often contrary to "official" Soviet diplomacy.

8. In 1941, just before the outbreak of the war, Stalin became the head of the State. He had formerly and formally been the head of the Party only. During the war, he governed as the chairman of the Council of Defense to which the Politbureau was subordinated. In the spring of 1946 the Council of Defense was abolished and the Council of Ministers set up, headed by Stalin. It is probable that ever since 1941, the power of the Party over the State has been declining.

9. Officially, the Party has never admitted such a development. In appraising the results of the 19th Party Congress of the CPSU, the Cominform Journal of 24 October actually claimed that the "leading and directing role of the Communist Party" would now be "raised to a still higher level." This may have been stated mainly for foreign consumption, and it is to be expected that the CPSU will continue such protestations if only to impress the parties outside the USSR. Nevertheless, it would be erroneous to underestimate the Party's remaining power, curtailed as it may be.

10. Although there have been indications that Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia intend to revise their Party statutes, it remains to be seen whether these or other Eastern European satellites will be permitted to imitate the Soviet example. It is possible that some changes in the administrative Party apparatus might be passed; however, it would be inconsistent

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with existing ideological principles of countries which are still "People's Democracies" and therefore have not achieved socialism, should emulate the CPSU. Certainly China, being in the state of a "new democracy on the road to socialism", is far behind the USSR and still completely dominated by its Party.

11. In Yugoslavia, the relegation of the CP to a relatively minor role is admittedly taking place. Milovan Djilas, one of Tito's closest associates, recently stated to an American government representative that "the revolution is over and therefore the role of the CP will change to that of a political and social agency for the education of the masses along the lines of social consciousness. In the early stages, it was the task of the CP to seize capitalist property, fight the class enemy, and rally the masses along nationalist lines against outside pressure. Since there is no longer a need that the CP retain such functions, its role is altered. It no longer can give orders in political, social and economic fields but must accomplish objectives through persuasion and leadership. Communists will not get jobs merely because of their Party membership." Djilas said that he did not expect such changes to become effective overnight and duly suppressed the publication of his statement in Yugoslavia. He admitted that the Party is no longer Leninist, as "Lenin lived in one age and we in another."

A TENTATIVE EVALUATION

12. Subordination of Party to State in the USSR does not, of course, imply an alteration of the long-range goals of Soviet Communism. However, there have been some evidences of a shift of Soviet tactics in various parts of the world toward less violent means -- such as encouragement of "united front" activities under the Communist Party label. It is interesting at least, and it may be significant, that the new CPSU statutes afford a parallel adaptation, within the Soviet Union, to the apparent changes in the program for Communist activities abroad.

13. There is much merit in the Stalinist concept that the doctrine must remain flexible enough to be adapted to changing circumstances, thus preventing it from becoming too brittle or impracticable. The Kremlin must cope with the fact that it is virtually impossible to maintain revolutionary fervor after 35 years of incessant propaganda and agitation, and after the claimed victory of socialism. Thus it is possible that the closer identification of the Party with the State, which worked so well during the war, may now be regarded as permanently necessary. It is easier to cultivate the inherent patriotism of the Soviet people than to nurture ad infinitum popular enthusiasm for a social utopia which is obviously far removed from the stark realities of the Soviet present.

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14. In addition, there may have been some practical reasons for a reversal of the Party-State power relationship, particularly:

- a. Streamlining the Soviet government, eliminating duplication of the Party and State bureaus and increasing overall efficiency;
- b. preventing influence peddling by Party bosses;
- c. decreasing Party influence in the armed forces which feel closer to the nation than to the Party and whose efficiency and loyalty might thus be increased;
- d. enhancing further the Great Russian element of the Soviet State by gradually eliminating even that amount of "cultural autonomy" which the Party was committed to grant the non-Russian nationalities.

15. It is difficult to predict what the change of the Party statutes, if the above interpretation of its nature is correct, would mean for Soviet foreign relations. The following points might be considered:

- a. The inclusion of elements of the peasantry and the "toiling intelligentsia" in the Party gives ex-post-facto blessing to Maoist doctrine, greatly augments the membership reservoirs throughout the world and helps the furtherance of united fronts;
- b. The Soviet State is a creature of the CPSU and will probably retain, for the time being, its Stalinist motivation. But if indeed the Soviet State is about to limit the former power of the Communist Party, it may possibly resort to strategies and tactics different from those which were decreed by the Politbureau or the Central Committee. This should not be understood as a return to conventional diplomacy but it may indicate a lessening influence of doctrinal considerations on high-level policy makers and an increasing attention to Realpolitik;
- c. If the organizational aspect of Leninism is terminated in fact while continuing to be upheld in theory; if, in other words, the Party is in fact deprived of its control over the State, but official propaganda continues to deny that this change has occurred, such contradiction may alienate the leaders of non-Soviet parties who are already smarting under the repeated reproaches of the Kremlin for their parties' "low ideological level."

CONCLUSION

16. The new statutes of the CPSU seem to indicate that the character of the Party and its position in the Soviet State have assumed new prospects.

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The changes can be interpreted as an eclipse of the Party in the USSR to the advantage of the Soviet State, but only the future will show whether this interpretation is wholly or partially correct. Stalinists are not fundamentalists; the Soviet leaders will not hesitate to revise the statutes again at the next Party Congress, if they think it advisable to do so.

17. Whether the changes in the 1952 statutes of the CPSU will contribute to an appreciable modification of Soviet policy, whether the Kremlin's willingness to risk war will be enhanced or reduced by a stronger State that rules by standards of power politics rather than of Communist doctrine, cannot as yet be estimated. However, it is probably safe to expect that the present chances of accurately predicting Soviet intentions will greatly decrease if the Party is subordinated to the State. So long as the Party's influence was strong, the ideology which it represented probably influenced Soviet policy decisions to a considerable degree. This has been recognized in several National Estimates. On the other hand, a national government, unimpeded by Party pressure, would be inclined to determine its courses of action in accordance with prevailing conditions and opportunities. To reach its objectives, it might abandon even the most basic doctrines. In other words, it would not hesitate to discard "scientific" Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist principles which have enabled intelligence-starved Allied governments to draw some rational conclusions from Communist behavior. Yet the Soviet State will almost certainly maintain a doctrinal front, thereby presenting to the outside world a confusing picture of motivating factors, the interpretation of which will be a hazardous venture and involve more dangerous guesswork than ever before.

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